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should be as much concerned to exonerate a lawyer
and prevent undeserved injury to his reputation as
to eliminate an undesirable lawyer from the ranks
of the profession. The procedure of investigation
should take full cognizance of the fact that, from
the mere fact that a complaint has been made, a
lawyer is likely to be injured somewhat if that fact
is known. Consequently, initial investigations
should be conducted with as much secrecy as pos-
sible. Reasonable ground to believe in the truth of
the charges having been discovered, the matter
should be pursued with promptness, thoroughness
and fearlessness by representatives of the Bar.
Adequate discovery of the facts, however, requires
the power to subpoena witnesses and administer
oaths. When misconduct is found which is indica-
tive of lack of character, the situation should be
dealt with courageously. In such cases elimination
of the lawyer is not only in the interest of the pro-
fession but of the public as well. In any stage of
the investigation when the lawyer is found to be
blameless, the representatives of his profession owe
it to themselves and to him to make an earnest at-
tempt to convince those who suspect him of mis-
conduct that he was blameless. If it becomes gen-
erally known that a lawyer has been charged with
misdeeds, findings which exonerate him should be
given publicity with a view to preventing injury as
much as possible. There will of course be some
small injury to lawyers complained against, even
when exonerated, in spite of all that can be done,
but this is the price that the individual lawyer must
contribute to a campaign which contemplates both
the elimination of undesirables and stopping that
undeserved injury to lawyers which results from
honest but erroneous conclusions of clients. The
campaign is one in which every honest and well
meaning lawyer can enthusiastically enlist.
EDWARD LIVINGSTON AND HIS LOUISIANA
PENAL CODE
Remarkable Career of Livingston-Resigns New York Mayoralty and District Attorneyship to
Enter Practice in New Orleans-The Louisiana of His Day-His Sympathetic Attitude to-
wards the Local Views-Legislature Passes Act for Preparation of Criminal Code to
Be Founded on the One Principle of the Prevention of Crime-Livingston Re-
ceives Appointment for Task-His Exceptional Qualifications for It-Mod-
ernity of Some of His Proposals-Code never Adopted, etc.
By JEROME HALL
Professor of Criminal Law and Criminology, Louisiana State University Law School
HE life' of Edward Livingston is an Americanepic. From its beginning on his ancestral estatesin New York to its close one hundred years ago
next May 23rd, it unfolds with sustained interest, dra-
matic and deeply inspiring. The boy spends his child-
hood in distinguished pre-revolutionary society, nur-
tured by fearless scholars who led the way to inde-
pendence under banners proclaiming the rights of man,
the innate worth of human beings and their freedom
from governmental oppression. He hears, learns from,
knows the great. On to Princeton; then the study of
law both common and civil, and in company with future
leaders of the Bar. To New York and eminence in
practice. Soon he is elected to the United States Con-
gress. Then he is appointed United States District
Attorney for New York, and simultaneously is elected
to and fills the office of Mayor of New York City.
Yellow fever lays low the population, and he ministers
unceasingly to the stricken folk. Weakened by his ex-
ertions, he falls, himself, victim to the epidemic. While
thus confined, a clerk absconds with $100,000--money
due the United States. With no intimation of blame
or liability, Livingston assumes the indebtedness, sells
his entire belongings, assigns the proceeds to the United
States and acknowledges a deficiency of approximately
1. Charles H. Hunt, Life of Edwrd Livingston (1864).
$44,000. With the hope of achieving quick financial
success in New Orleans, he resigns the New York
mayoralty and district attorneyship, and, aged 39; he
goes in 1803 to Louisiana-to rise to eminence at the
Bar and in public life and to immortality in the world
of legal scholarship.
To understand the man and his work, and the qual-
ity of genius that uniquely fitted him for his abundant
contribution, it is necessary to know the Louisiana of
his day. Long before any settlement on the Atlantic
coast, the Spaniards had explored Florida, founded
St. Augustine, and penetrated the Southwest far into
Mexico. Years later, in the last quarter of the seven-
teenth century, Marquette and Joliet cut a perilous
route down the Father of the Waters until they came
to the border of the Spaniards' southern domain, when,
deterred by fear of enslavement or assassination, they
turned back and brought their wonder-rousing reports
to their compatriots in Canada. In 1682 the undaunted
chevalier de La Salle led a party to the very mouth
of the Mississippi, making no settlement but planting
the flag of his king on the vast domain he called
Louisiana. In 1699 three of the Le Moyne brothers
left their Canadian estates, established successful settle-
ments in Louisiana, and became the first governors.
From then until Spain took possession, construc-
tively in 1762, actually in 1769, French law governed.
192 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL
In 1769 O'Reilly proclaimed Spanish laws and planted
Spanish judicial and political institutions in the teeth
of strenuous but, for the time being, inadequate resist-
ance. In 1800 the Little Corporal forced Spain to sur-
render the American dominion; and in 1803 Living-
ston's older brother, Robert, and Monroe negotiated
the Louisiana Purchase for fifteen million dollars.
The vast Louisiana Purchase included at least the
present states of Louisiana, Arkansas, Missouri, Iowa,
Oklahoma, Nebraska, North and South Dakota, Mon-
tana, Colorado, Wyoming, and part of Minnesota.
When Livingston arrived in New Orleans in 1804 he
found a town of about 8,000 inhabitants, half of whom
were white persons, chiefly of French descent. In
1806 the territory had a population of about 53,000 per-
sons of whom 23,500 were slaves, 3,500 free colored,
and 26,000 whites, of whom more than half were natives
of Louisiana, mostly French. 2
In Louisiana Livingston found men of learning
and ability, devoted to French culture, and resentful of
attempts to substitute an alien language and alien laws.
His sympathetic grasp of the situation is an object
lesson in the resolution of culture conflicts. He en-
deared himself by his distinguished services in support
of the civil law. In the second year of his residence he
simplified the civil practice and procedure, and saw his
recommendations enacted April 10, 1805. Twenty
years later, he collaborated with Lislet and Derbigny
in the drafting of both the Code of Practice of 1825
and the Civil Code.
On May 4, 1805 the Territory passed a compre-
hensive act naming, but not defining, practically all of
the important common law crimes, and adopting the
English common law system, both substantive and pro-
cedural, as regards the designated offenses. Subse-
quent crimes were to be defined by statute. Between
1805 and 1821 a number of other penal statutes were
enacted. The Congressional Act of March 26, 1804
had provided for the continuance of those territorial
laws not inconsistent with jury trial, habeas corpus,
bail, and the privilege against "cruel and unusual pun-
ishments." Livingston was convinced that the con-
gressional and territorial legislation did not completely
abolish the prior Spanish penal law. Later decisions
indicate rather clearly that the judges in fact looked
to the English law for interpretation; and it does not
appear that Spanish laws were drawn upon to any ex-
tent either for that purpose or to fill in lacunae. But
that possibility combined with numerous difficulties of
the common law and the confusion resulting from
hastily drawn legislation, to induce wide reform.
On Februar' 10, 1820 the General Assembly of
Louisiana passed the historic act providing that there
be prepared a code of criminal law to be "founded on
one principle, viz., the prevention of crime; that all
offences should be clearly and explicitly defined, in
language generally understood; that punishments
should be proportioned to offences; that the rules of
evidence should be ascertained as applicable to each
offence; that the mode of procedure should be simple,
and the duty of magistrates, executive officers and in-
dividuals assisting them, should be pointed out by law." 8
In February, 1821 Livingston received the appoint-
ment-57 years of age, at the peak of his intellectual
vigor, and with vast varied experience, a linguist versed
in Latin, French, and Spanish, a scholar familiar with
Roman and comparative law, a master of the common
2. Claiborne, Official Letters, etc.
3. The Complete Works of Edward Liv4ngston on Crinm-
nal Jurisprudence (1873) vol I, p. 1.
law, as well. Two intensive years of unremitting labor
led to completion of the project. Then, at the very end
of his task, his manuscript was totally destroyed by
fire. Unhappy, but indefatigable, and with unshaken
faith in the need for his code, Livingston immediately
started afresh and produced the voluminous works that
we possess. His code was never adopted. But, if the
judgment of gifted contemporaries be valid criterion,
the work that roused the unbounded praise and enthusi-
asm of Bentham, Hugo, Kent, Story and Marshall
must have been of the rarest quality, indeed.
His System of Penal Law has five divisions: A
Code of Crimes and Punishments, A Code of Procedure,
A Code of Evidence, A Code of Reform and Discipline,
and A Book of Definitions. At the outset, and fre-
quently later, he declared that "no act of legislation
can or ought to be immutable." So, too, if we wish
to understand his work we must strive to read it in
light of the problems of over a century ago, as well
as against the background of the then-prevalent phil-
osophies.
The most remarkable feature of the Code of Crimes
and Punishments is the "total abolition of capital pun-
ishment."' 4 Fully aware of universal opposition (all the
states were then retaining the capital penalty) he sum-
moned his greatest powers of analysis and persuasion,
and presented an argument that has never been sur-
passed. Brilliantly he endeavored to establish the in-
effectiveness of capital punishment as a deterrent of
crimes of strong passion; the greater effects of life
imprisonment; its. destruction of the public sensibilities;
the avoidance of the prescription by jurors and wit-
nesses; and the unfortunate experience of communities
that inflicted the penalty in comparison with two or
three others, where, for a time, it was abolished, show-
ing, he concluded "not only that it fails in any repres-
sive effect, but that it promotes the crime" (murder). 5
His analysis and the reform he so eloquently urged
caught the imagination of scholars and humanitarians
the world over; and none can say how great an effect
his report has had nor when his masterly appeal may
again inspire complete reexamination of the problem.
It is possible merely to touch upon a few of the
other salient features of the Code of Crimes: No child
under nine could be convicted of any crime. A married
woman who committed a crime under command or
persuasion of her husband, was to receive one-half the
penalty otherwise provided. The punishment for a
second offense was to be increased by half; and one
who had twice been convicted of a crime, was, upon a
third conviction, to be imprisoned at hard labor for life.
He would exempt close relations from liability as ac-
cessories after the fact. Contempt of court was rigidly
curtailed. Strikingly novel were offenses against the
liberty of the press, which included even legislation to
restrain the right. Adultery was made criminal, a
wife being punished more severely than a husband.
Assaults on officers carried double punishment as did
assaults by men against women, and wards against
tutors. Murders were divided into four ascending
grades: infanticide, assassination, murder under trust,
and parricide. Suicide was made not criminal. And
it was made a conspiracy to combine to raise or, and
this was not in the English statute nor yet, I believe,
in American jurisprudence, to reduce wages-the pen-
alty for employers being imprisonment, that for em-
ployees, imprisonment or fine.
Livingston's Code of Criminal Procedure was prob-
4. Id. I, 224.
5. Id. I, 201.
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ably much more truly prophetic. He deplored the dis-
regard of preventive remedies; and though his plan
for reward of informers has not found legal sanction,
his provisions for enlistment of public cooperation by
honorary rewards, for early education, and for relief
of economic insecurity challenge contemporary scholar-
ship to reconstruct the traditional coercive legal ap-
paratus and provide theory and instrumentality for
prevention of criminal behavior.
His proposals regarding the preliminary magis-
terial hearing have but recently been adopted, and in
certain important matters he is still leading the way.
To avoid tricking the accused, the magistrate's exami-
nation was to be limited to specified questions; the
answers were to be recorded, corrected, signed by the
accused, and transmitted with the record, to the trial
court. The accused, being protected from catch-ques-
tioning, must have his refusal to answer militate against
him.
In matters of simplification of pleading, Livingston
was a full century in advance of his time, Here, espe-
cially, his linguistic bent, inspired probably by Bentham,
found an apt sphere of application. The classic story
of his informing a newly arrived and apprehensive
practitioner that he could learn all the rules of Louisiana
pleading in the course of a dinner's conversation is
somi indication of their simplicity. After conviction,
no judgment was to be arrested for any defect save
failure to allege a crime. A rather unique proposal
was provision that the defendant was to present the
closing argument.
From a political point of view the sections on
habeas corpus and jury trial are most significant. By
requiring the magistrate to issue a warrant for the
prisoner, he sought to avoid circumvention of the writ
by police officers. All offenses were to be tried by jury;
but any number agreed upon, less than twelve, could
try a misdemeanor. Unanimous verdict was required.
The originality of the Code of Evidence may be
seen from such provisions as the following: where one
is convicted because of the unjust operation of the rules
regarding admission or exclusion of evidence, the court
is directed to report to the legislature and withhold
judgment until the end of the session, when, if the code
is altered, a new trial must be granted; the refusal to
exclude the testimony of husband or wife, for or against
the other; and the abolition of the rule denying a party
the right to discredit his own witness either by cross-
examination to test veracity, or by calling character
witnesses.
The Code of Reform and Prison Discipline is in
some respects the most remarkable of all. Throughout,
the objective was prevention of crime through "re-
straint, example and reformation." Where prisoners
were indiscriminately mingled, including even, in those
days, persons awaiting trial, the grossest contamina-
tion resulted. Livingston advocated careful classifica-
tion and segregation of typical groups. He worked out
a detailed program to include not only treatment of
the criminal but also support and training of the eco-
nomically submerged. To appreciate the sweep of his
constructive imagination, it may be recalled that even
at Auburn which was one of the most progressive of
American penal institutions, treatment was character-
ized by solitary confinement, absolute silence, and un-
restrained, frequent use of the lash by the turnkeys:
Livingston advocated a system of education that
would give instruction in the duties of the citizen to-
wards the state, towards each other, and in those prin-
ciples of religion that were common to all sects.
He proclaimed as an axiom that "political society
. . . owes necessary subsistence to all those who can-
not procure it for themselves." To this end he would
establish a House of Industry where, in one department,
those who desired would be given employment, and,
in another department, vagrants and able-bodied beg-
gars would be forced to Work. These latter, arrested
at an early age and taught to be industrious, would, he
believed, remove a prolific source of criminality. In
the jail, offenders were to be subjected, according to
the moral turpitude of their offenses, to various de-
grees of imprisonment, labor, and solitude. To the
improvement of housing conditions, sanitation, the edu-
cation and comfort of prisoners, Livingston made many
notable suggestions. And he sought to provide for
the reestablishment in society of discharged convicts
by throwing open to those unable to find employment,
the facilities of the House of Refuge and Industry. As
to juvenile offenders, the place of confinement was to
be "a school of instruction rather than a prison for de-
grading punishment."' Finally he emphasized the im-
portance of personnel in penal institutions, and pro-
vided for a board of inspectors to be liberally remuner-
ated. All of these projects were not novel, but, as he
stated, "they had never before been consolidated and
presented as component parts of a whole system."
The basic philosophic tenets upon which Living-
ston constructed the above codes were utilitarian, indi-
vidualistic, and humanitarian.
To understand the Utilitarianism which the Liv-
ingston codes represent, one must look back a full cen-
tury before he wrote. The intellectual origins were
diverse. There was the hedonistic ideology which Gay
in 1730 reestablished as a basic philosophic viewpoint.
Next, and at least equally distinctive, was the prestige
of Newtonian mechanics, which, like relativity at pres-
ent, influenced all departments of thought. Professor
Hutcheson of Glasgow, a forerunner of Hume and the
teacher of Adam Smith, was among the first to suggest
application of exact scientific method to "moral
science." In 1738 Hume proposed the introduction of
the experimental method into moral subjects, and he
applied the idea of Newtonian attraction to psychologic
association, arguing that mental phenomena were mutu-
ally attractive and in causal interrelationship. This
conception was pushed further in 1749 by Hartley who
superadded the principle of continguity and drew close
analogies between mental phenomena, thus viewed,
and physical attractive forces. In France, Helvetius, to
whom Bentham fervently expressed his profound debt
for the suggestion of a science of legislation, also
"wished to treat morals like any other science and to
make an experimental morality like an experimental
physics"; and he argued that "there exists a pedagogic
art of inspiring and ruling the passions whose prin-
ciples are 'as certain as the principles of geometry.' "
Helvetius' writing was taken up by Beccaria, who em-
phasized, naturally, the mathematical claims of the new
moral science, formulated the principle of "the greatest
good to the greatest number," and applied the utilitarian
ideology to crime and penal law.
Bentham who became the recognized fount of util-
6. Id. I, 528-9.
7. Id. I, 573.
8. Id. I, 586. For very interesting comment, see Two
Letters of Chancellor Kent 12 Am. L. Rev. 479.
9. See Hal~vy, Philosophical Radicalism in the 19th Cen-
tury.
194 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL
itarianism, must be read against these intellectual and
cultural movements. And it is little exaggeration to
state that Livingston was Bentham's ardent disciple.
He referred to Bentham as "the man who has thrown
more light on the science of legislation that any other in
ancient or modem times,' 0 "a man to whom statues
would be raised if the benefactors of mankind were
as much honored as the oppressors of nations,"" and
as "a most profound writer on this subject" (evi-
dence) .'
Livingston's insistence upon the statement of rea-
sons in support of the provisions of any code, his dis-
tinction between immediate and remote means of pre-
venting offenses, his eloquent appeal to address the
people "in the language of reason," and, to invite them
"to obey the laws by showing that they are framed on
the great principle of utility !,"I$ his deliberate avowal
that he has "taken . . . utility for the sole object of
[his] provisions,"' 4 that "in affixing punishments, we
should compare the evil of the offense with that neces-
sarily caused by the punishment, and decide as the
balance shall incline"'--here and throughout we see
clear indications of a major intellectual influence upon
the leading American exponent of 19th century utili-
tarianism in law.
The bent for mathematical precision and applica-
tion of exact scientific thought in social disciplines char-
acterized the Classical School in penology. We see this
predilection-a still prevalent one-in Livingston's as-
signment of specific penalties (fines and years of con-
finement) to a carefully dissected mass of criminal
offences. Thus, the penalty for second convictions was
an addition of half to the punishment otherwise pre-
scribed.'6 A fine must never exceed one-fourth of the
value of the property of the offender.' 7 Fines of public
officers bore a certain proportion to income; fines for
bribes were fixed in proportion to the value of the
bribe. Typical was the provision that:
"Where negligent homicide in the second grade has
been committed, in the doing or the attempt to do an act
which is an injury, but not an offence, one-fifth shall be
added to the punishment. If the act done or attempted,
be a misdemeanor, but not an offence against the person,
one-fourth shall be added. If it be one of those designated
as an offence against the person, but not one of those
offences designated as murder, one-half shall be added.
If it be a crime punishable with imprisonment at hard
labour for any term less than life, the punishment shall be
doubled, and the imprisonment shall be at hard labour. And
if the act be done or attempted to be done, be a crime
punishable with imprisonment for life, the homicide shall be
punished by imprisonment at hard labour for life." 18
Livingston's Classicism should not be evaluated in
the light of subsequent knowledge. Nor can it be
understood except when viewed as a revolt from the
indiscriminate cruelty of the preexisting English law. 9
This insistence upon exact penalties must be considered
in conjunction with the humanitarian sentiments that
supplied the intellectual fuel to motivate application of
the prevalent scientific ideology to crime and law.
The humanitarian movement received great im-
10. Op. cit. supra footnote 3, I, 155.
11. Id. I, 209.
12. Id. I, 426. And see vol. 11. Works of Bentham (Ed.
by Bowring) at 23, 35, 37, 51 for correspondence with Livings-
ton.
13. Id. I, 175.
14. Id. I, 87.
15. Id. I, 236.
16. Id. II, Art 52, at 24.
17. Id. II, Art. 90, at 33.
18. Id. II, Art. 532, at 144.
19."Executions for some crimes were attended with butch-
petus from the publication in 1764 (the year of Living-
ston's birth) of Beccaria's epoch-making booklet. In
England the work immediately stimulated in penology
the spirit that moved in many fields. John Howard,
Elizabeth Fry, Samuel Romilly and Fowell Buxton
carried the torch of humanity into the prisons and the
parliaments. Livingston's attempt to abolish capital
punishment completely and his program for peno-cor-
rectional reform are outstanding instances of the deep
humanity that guided him throughout.
Humanitarianism fused also with idealist indi-
vidualism-the latter being represented by laissez-faire,
by political guarantees against executive abuse, and by
the reformulation and intense avowal of natural rights.
Livingston's most sensitive years were molded by this
thought. Members of his family helped initiate the
Revolution and his sister's husband died on the field;
they joined in the Declaration of Independence; they
were among the first to fill important places in the
judicial and legislative branches of the new government.
He could not be other than an ardent exponent of in-
dividual rights and interests.
His insistence upon protection of the individual
from possible governmental oppression is strikingly ap-
parent in the codes. He sought to check official dis-
cretion rigorously, not because offenders escaped but
because the innocent might be caught in the web of
"constructive crime," and "ex post facto laws."" His
advocacy of trial by jury is one of the most eloquent
ever made, and instructive, too, if one have an eye to
the relationship of procedure to philosophy, and to the
historical relativity of political institutions. His pro-
posals to make habeas corpus more effective, his rather
visionary plans to insure liberty of the press by mak-
ing interference with it criminal-even when such in-
terference was by the legislature itself-these and many
other provisions were logical deductions from indi-
vidualistic premises immortalized by the Revolution,
and adopted by Livingston as axioms of practical be-
havior in every realm.
We need to study Livingston because he provides
us with the only detailed analysis in English of many
of the problems involved in penal code making, coupled
with application of the analysis made. His thought
illuminates our own, even though we have made con-
siderable progress in the social disciplines during the
past century, and are therefore better equipped for penal
legislation.
We cannot here make an analysis of the problems
involved in the construction of a modem penal code.
21
But we may briefly examine certain problems which
Livingston analyzed, and which, restated in a somewhat
newer terminology, will necessarily engage our close
attention if we take up the legal needs of our times in
ery that would disgust a savage . . . No proportion was pre-
served between crimes and punishments. The cutting of a twig,
and the assassination of a parent; breaking a fishpond, and
poisoning a whole family or murdering them in their sleep, all
incurred the same penalties; and two hundred different actions,
many not deserving the name of offences, were punishable by
death." Livingston, Works I, 12.
Cf. the writer's Theft, Law and Society (1935) pp. 97ff.
20. "Everywhere, with but few exceptions, the interest of
the many has, from the earliest ages, been sacrificed to the
power of the few. Everywhere penal laws have been framed
to support this power; and those institutions, favorable to free-
dom, which have come down to us from our ancestors, form no
part of any original plan, but are isolated privileges which have
been wrested from the grasp of tyranny." Livington, op. cit.
supra. I, 54.
21. See the writer's forthcoming article, Criminology and
a Modern Penal Code (1936).
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anything like the spirit which guided this scholar of
the last century in his unaided studies.
Like other cultural manifestations, the laws of any
time and place more or less reflect current prevalent
philosophic views--even to the point of their inherent
inconsistencies. I have stressed the philosophical bases
of Livingston's work because it seems to me that such
influences are unescapable conditioning factors. If that
be true, it is delusive to imagine that we can prepare
a code which will suffice for all time. Livingston's
understanding of these limitations upon his own codes,
led him to espouse Bentham's plan of flexible legisla-
tion. He would have the courts constantly report their
experiences to the legislature together with recom-
mendations. In part, his program resulted from an-
tipathy towards judicial legislation, legal fictions, and
constructive offenses. But there is also some dawning
recognition of the limitations necessarily placed upon
courts, as constituted, to conduct empirical researches
regarding social problems involved in adjudication.
Hence he nourished Bentham's recommendation of a
Ministry of Justice, which has found rather wide sup-
port in recent years among American scholars. The
term, "Ministry of Justice" is, however, rather un-
fortunate because it suggests the continental method
of political supervision and control of judiciary. As
a permanent research organization, the plan offers
abundant prospect of coordination of the judicial and
legislative organs of government, and of sounder oper-
ation of both. Thus, recognition of the relativity of
current philosophic views-at least as they appear in
their specific forms and terminologies--carries the im-
plication that research is an endless quest, as is the
perennial readaptation of laws to meet new social prob-
lems.
Equally fundamental are the methods of research.
The epistemological problems here involved, deserve de-
tailed analysis. 2 But we may with profit examine Liv-
ingston's methods. If we read Beccaria and then turn
to Livingston, we see at once in the latter, a great dim-
inution in reliance upon given abstract principles and
a marked tendency towards empirical research. It is
true that we find language that smacks of the earlier
rationalism, e.g., the statement that with certain "rules
constantly before us . . . we can proceed with con-
fidence and ease, to the task of penal legislation; and
we may see at a glance, or determine by a single
thought, whether any proposed provision is consonant
to those maxims which we have adopted as the dictates
of truth ;"1'2 and that "provided [a code] contains the
true principles of legislation . . . every future law
will be measured by their standard. Then no more dis-
cordant provisions; no more vacillating legislation; ...
none of those evils, in short, which are contrary to
these principles."2  But such generalization is rare;
and there are numerous acute observations that indicate
complete awareness of formal and terminological dif-
ficulties. Indeed he regularly proceeds to reconcile and
apply his principles in the light of his experience, and
he reaches highly persuasive conclusions. Much more
significant is Livingston's deliberate and frequent use of
empirical data. He sought to avail himself "of the ad-
vantage which those experiments [other states' peni-
tentiary systems] afforded," and "to know, with pre-
cision, their results." "This information," he con-
tinues, "could only be obtained by collecting the returns
and official reports of the different establishments, and
inducing men of eminence and abilities to communicate
22. Cf. ibid.
23. Livingston, op. cit. supra footnote 3, 1, 10.
24. Id. 1, 229.
their observations on the subject. ' 25 He therefore sent
out "circular letters" (questionnaires). 2 6  In his study
of capital punishment, he sought to eliminate bias, to
achieve what we are wont to call "objectivity." "I
strove," he writes, "to clear my understanding from all
prejudices which education or early impressions might
have created, and produce a frame of mind fitted for
the investigation of truth . . . [and] endeavored to
procure a knowledge of the practickl effect of this
punishment on different crimes in the several countries
where it is inflicted. ' 2' He argued that "the result is
capable of being demonstrated by figures," 28 and he at-
tached statistical tables. But he was hampered by the
"want of authentic documents" which prevented him
from presenting "facts which would elucidate the sub-
ject by examples from the records of criminal courts
in the different states. The prevalence of particular
offences, as affected by the changes in their criminal
laws; the number of commitments, compared with that
of convictions; and the effect which the punishment of
death has on the frequency of the crimes for which it
is inflicted; accurate information on these heads would
have much facilitated the investigation in which we are
engaged."29  He searched for "sufficient data"; he ex-
amined English and other statistics.' He proposed to
engage in field work by devoting "a few months of the
summer to a personal examination of the different in-
stitutions of the kind [penal] in the Atlantic states."'"
He desired that reports be made "of all causes that are
tried, and all points of law that are determined in the
court, and to publish them at stated times, and to make
regular returns of all commitments, accusations, indict-
ments, informations and trials, in such form as to give
every desirable information of the state of crime and
criminal jurisprudence in his district. These returns
are to be made to the governor, to be by him laid be-
fore the legislature. A mass of information will thus
be collected which will be of the utmost value in future
legislation."2 2 He constructed partial mortality tables
showing the number of persons committed for trial,
tried, convicted, discharged or acquitted.
In recent years we have, to be sure, become more
critical of propositions proposed as premises, more in-
sistent upon the application of narrow generalizations,
to be tentatively accepted as hypotheses, and held valid
only in so far as supported by empirical data. We have
by analysis and experiment become thoroughly con-
scious of methods, more specific in the recording of
data, more cautious in generalizing from them. And
we have almost undreamed-of facilities for carrying on
large-scale research. In our further advance in these
directions, we must not forget the persistent rational
use to which Livingston subjected all available data,
without which fact-finding is a blind and pointless
effort, nor the modernity of his approach. Unfortu-
nately lack of data and facilities made it impossible to
construct his codes upon the results of scientific re-
search. One man was research organization, drafts-
man', lawyer and publicist. His great accomplishment,
scientific progress in the ensuing century, and our
vastly increased research facilities should encourage
present endeavor.
Sound legislation depends not only upon analysis
25. Id. I. 7.
26. Id. 1, 8.
27. Id. I, 35.
28. Id. I, 199.
29. Id. I, 48.
30. Id. I, 49.
31. Id. I, 73.
32. Id. I, 402.
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of prevailing philosophies and upon scientific research
but also upon the formulation of adequate word symbols
to denote the empirical generalizations discovered. This
problem is a linguistic one, and, in law, a largely tech-
nical one as well. Modernization of legal language
means the construction of symbols which adequately
refer to existing fact situations and to present knowl-
edge regarding them. It will call also for the elimina-
tion of useless technicality, and of ambiguity and re-
dundancy.
To these latter ends Livingston made valuable
contributions. He sought assiduously to avoid every
unnecessary technical term, and to provide explanations
for such terms in his Book of Definitions. He argued
that ambiguity and vagueness perverted the judicial
function from ascertainment of the facts and application
of the rules, to declaration and interpretation of the
law."5 Hence clarification and precision "more than
any other," called for his "closest and intensest atten-
tion. ' ' We have in recent years discovered that the
language problem is much more complicated than has
hitherto been thought. But no draftsman will fail to
benefit from Livingston's refreshing, persistent attempts
to eradicate ambiguity, vagueness, and outmoded tech-
nicality from the law.
There remain to be considered, certain special
problems in regard to codification. Here Livingston
preceded Field, and his analysis ran deeper and in
broader channels. Livingston was a keen critic of the
common law, and his lack of bias is apparent from his
unstinted praise of the political guarantees and safe-
guards provided by English law. 5  He deplored the
uncertainty of the common law; the fact that it cannot
be known until a case arises for its application, when
it is established not by the legislature but by the
courts, 6 the difficulty of distinguishing old statutes
from common law; inaccurate reporting and consequent
confusion; the injustice and absurdity that adherence
to precedent frequently produces; the voluminous litera-
ture which imposes an absolute physical limitation upon
its comprehension.
Some of his criticism was occasioned by the fact
that, at that time, three-fourths of the Louisianians did
not read English, and were, for other reasons, also op-
posed to the introduction of the common law. Besides,
his concern for the safeguarding of the individual from
governmental oppression, combined with his inheritence
of the Jefferies' tradition of judicial persecution, 7 led
him to fear and to oppose judicial legislation. The
English had "seen their fellow subjects hanged for con-
structive felonies; quartered for constructive treasons;
and roasted alive for constructive heresies.""8  Hence
Livingston sought to restrict the judge to the law, and
33. Id. I, 178, 179.
34. Id. I, 228-30. His solution of the difficulties pre-
sented by the rules on forgery are especially suggestive for sev-
eral other problems resulting from the accumulation of numer-
ous highly refined concepts and a judicial technique which re-
quires identification with one of them (Cf. id. I, 279). He pro-
posed to state simply "an instrument in writing, of which a
copy is attached," instead of designating it a note, or bond, or
bill, etc. (Id. I, 376).
35. He relied very considerably upon the common law for
his code-e.g., "The numerous cases in the English law on this
subject (murder) were studied, and all those principles drawn
from them which could give precision to the rules that are
laid down." (Id. I, 306).
36. Id. I, 88ff.
37. "It will not be denied that England has suffered the
most cruel evils by this exercise of judicial power . . . we may,
hereafter, have a judge who may exercise his constructive in-
genuity upon murders or burglary, or other offences, as Jef-
feries did upon treason." Id. I, 232.
38. Id. I, 13.
to statement of the evidence only when requested by
the jury.is "Judges," he said, "acquire a habit . . .
of taking a side in every question they hear debated.
. . . neutrality cannot . . . be expected, . . . In
the theory of our law, judges are the counsel for the
accused, in practice they are, with a few honourable
exceptions, the most virulent prosecutors"'' He sought,
too, to limit rigorously the sentencing power of the
judge, although he did provide a sphere of individual-
ization. And indeed his code was not as restrictive of
judicial discretion as some of his remarks might lead one
to expect. 41 But his general opposition to official dis-
cretion led him to oppose it also in peno-correctional
treatment, thinking it "unsafe to adopt a system that
must depend entirely for its success on the personal
qualities of the man who is to carry it into effect.""2
Livingston believed that legislation might be as in-
congruous, complex, and unwieldy as the common
law."3 He held that a code, amended frequently, would
remove the deficiencies of the common law. A code
would provide fixed principles and systematization of
rules, not otherwise attainable. The judges would rely
upon "grammatical construction; the context of the
law, the signification usually given to the words em-
ployed, or their technical meaning in reference to the
subject matter."' 4  But they must follow the "plain
import of the words," and must not say "that the law
means more, sometimes less, than the legislature in-
tended."' 5  His insistence upon constant amendment
must be considered as supplementary, and as a preven-
tive of inflexibility. The problem promises to become
increasingly important. Indeed, we find such a common
law scholar as Mr. Wilshire, in his preface to the
fifteenth edition of Harris' Criminal Law, stating:
"The mass of new legislation has made it necessary to
increase to some extent the size of the volume, and,
unless some steps are taken in the direction of codifica-
tion, it will soon be impossible to produce a work of
this character which will be of any value."
Unfortunately, early legal training, tradition, and,
perhaps even, vested interest, give rise to predilection
and bias, not to impartial study of the problems in-
volved. Certainly a minimum desideratum is painstak-
ing investigation of the operations of code systems of
penal law.
Even though a penal code be rejected or deferred,
there will remain the insistent need to improve penal
legislation. Perhaps it will be possible to effect a sound
synthesis of various legal materials and methods; or to
employ particular techniques with reference to the needs
of the specific problems dealt with in the various fields
of law. In any event it is clear that cultivation of a
science of legislation is a paramount need of our times.
If that be true, Livingston's notable contributions must
be the starting point of present endeavor in the crim-
inal law, at least. If his breadth of scholarship can be
joined to the vastly greater research facilities which
we enjoy, the most pressing legal needs of contempor-
ary society will be abundantly supplied.
39. Id. I, 69.
40. Id. I, 70.
41. Id. 1, 60, 362-3, 397.
42. Id. 1, 521.
43. Id. I, 11, 135.
44. Id. I, 180.
45. Id. 1, 231.
*This paper was presented at the annual meeting of the As-
sociation of American Law Schools at New Orleans on Dec.
28, 1935. For assistance in research, I am indebted to Mr.
Duncan C. Murchison, Graduate Student, Louisiana State Uni-
versity Law School.
